http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/ With regular column submissions (open to all members) and featured guest writers - through audio, visual and the written word - exchanging ideas and having your say has never been easier Copyright 2010 2010-02-04T13:21:34+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/ucl_shrp_executive_office_elections_call_for_applications/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/ucl_shrp_executive_office_elections_call_for_applications/ Call for Applications: Executive Office Elections - MARCH 2010 March will see the election of the UCL Student Human Rights Programme’s Executive. All UCL students (undergraduates and postgraduates, at any stage) are entitled to stand for the executive positions below but only members are entitled to vote (all UCL students may become members at any time) Should you wish to apply, the following executive positions will be available: 1. President 2. Vice-President 3. Secretary 4. Treasurer 5. External Relations and Innovations *For more information about the current board please see our people. Applications Applications will be open from 02/Mar/2010 until 16/Mar/2010, 10 pm. All applications should be sent to and must be accompanied by: 1. Cover letter expressing which of a maximum of 2 board positions you wish to apply for (and/or in which initiative(s) you wish to get involved). Please highlight: (a) Any previous involvement with the UCLSHRP (b) Relevant skills & experience (c) Relevant interests (d) Evidence of a pro-active attitude 2. Curriculum Vitae Elections (Annual General Meeting - AGM) Date: March 23 (Tuesday), 6pm. During the AGM the new Executive Officers will be selected by direct vote of all eligible members of the Programme (i.e. those who have been members for at least 28 days prior). For more details, see section 11 of the UCLSHRP Constitution available here Mandate The elected executive will be in office until the next AGM, in November 2010, when the following positions will also be renewed: • UCL Human Rights Review Editor-in-Chief • UCL Human Rights Bulletin Editor-in-Chief • Events Co-ordinator • The Exchange Editor-in-Chief • Website Manager • Abolition of Freedom Audit Co-ordinator • ECHR Moots Co-ordinator • Sponsorship Manager • Publicity Manager • Human Resources Manager • Grass Roots Co-ordinator • International Action Team Co-ordinator • Equal Rights Trust Research (ERT) Co-ordinator Results The election results will be announced by 24/Mar/2010 by email and published here on the website. We look forward to hearing from you! Best regards The UCL SHRP team http://www.uclshrp.com/ SHRP News 2010-03-04T09:27:24+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/extremism_on_campusbut_fascism_off/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/extremism_on_campusbut_fascism_off/ As is becoming increasingly more frequent for me, I have (true, perhaps somewhat cynically) found the comments made to a lot of the articles discussing the “Detroit bomber” more insightful than the articles themselves and somewhat more frightening than some of the news they report. I have been asking myself: which is most representative of my society? Where some would introduce a disclaimer, I imply this by convention and I declare outright that I studied at UCL during the last year of the relevant 2005-2008 period, and can also be said to have been an active student as VP of the UCL Student Human Rights Programme – though arguably perhaps not activist for some and not activist enough for others. All of this initiates the passionate rebuke I want to write, coming to the rescue of UCL… but that is merely what it is. The implications of this entire affair are much wider and deeper than UCL and my feelings towards it. So who is to blame? And for what exactly? As ever, it’s hard to explain irrationality to one who argues irrationally and without logic. (Remember those who asked what we would do with the uncharged, unconvicted Guantanamo detainees if we released them.) But, once we clear away all of the unhelpful, rather rude, unsubstantiated and plainly silly points made on this matter, we’re left with the questions, could UCL have prevented this and, if so, should it have done? It seems that the amalgam of the arguments are that, given the reality in which we exist, universities need to distinguish illegal extremism from extremism, and police the latter as well; they need to employ serious mechanisms to detect this extremism; and they need to look at the current recipe for terrorism and eradicate all ingredients. Why? Well the argument is that our universities are currently too susceptible and even too conducive to extremism and extremist exploitation. The reason why this issue is wider and deeper than this current episode is that the weak point in our universities is implied to be their culture and educational ethos of diversity, free thought, free speech, free association and free communication that reflect the very values of our democracy. Are we to have different ‘laws’ on and off campus? The solutions offered (vetting applicants, racially and religiously discriminatory admissions, association and communication policies, audio-visual surveillance, chaperones…) are futile in preventing terrorism, because, even if they were to be successful, extremism will simply be inconvenienced, ushered off campus. But, alas, at least we will have one less place to look for a scapegoat! Great. And if our solutions are to follow the extremist off campus, to wherever conversations can be held, then we no doubt have ourselves a regime flowering nicely into one reminiscent of Germany early last century, Burma, Zimbabwe and North Korea as it still is. And this is the point: are we to decry fascism off campus but not on? Without the rigorous intellectual analysis of controversial issues by universities we risk stultifying our current philosophy, handicapping our democracy and substituting dogma. What would our new definition of extremism be anyhow? It is even often hard to distinguish the law’s standard of incitement of hatred and violence from an analysis of such. So should we outlaw any debate relating to hatred or violence, for example a criminal law or philosophy debate about the difficult question of whether murder is ever moral or justified? Just as another product of our universities, Tony Blair, recently conceded he wanted to invade, and felt justified in invading, Iraq regardless of WMDs but arguably wouldn’t because the law made this impossible, perhaps some debaters may believe that honour killings and the assassination of sinners are as justified as self-defence, but then also only theoretically. I may disagree with their theory but so what, who am I? Reasoned rebuttal is more helpful to society than my intuition. Indeed, inciting hatred against entire nations of people and calling for violence from our armed forces by “the powers that be” is on the right side of the line. It’s not extremism because although innocent people die, the people to whom we have given a prestigious title and our vote are the infallible and incontrovertible authorities on the common good, right? Whatever definition you favour, no matter how much ‘extremism’ and preaching to which one is exposed, before any actual criminal act occurs, the choice still has to take place in that individual’s head and if they require more information they will seek it out. Surely a university is a good place for this debate (within the law) because more perspectives can be offered rather than just one extremist dogma, making what for some may be an inevitable choice a more informed one. The evidence does not necessarily even suggest that any controversial university talks have led to terrorism, only that, of the thousands of students at a university, a few of those who have had a hand in attempting to organise such talks have become terrorists. Soon we’ll be blaming video games, films and music… again. But what is it about terrorism that compels us all to treat it differently to crime? Take murder, we aren’t asking universities to vet and monitor students more susceptible to provocation, perhaps with a proclivity to overreact violently. We think terrorism should be prevented, we merely hope that murder can. Maybe it is the patriotism we suddenly feel; the Britishness of our identities is insulted by the hatred of the foreign-thinking extremists. So we react with similar irrational hatred. We don’t wish to clothe, shelter or feed the homeless, but suddenly we care if they are blown up by foreigners! In the end is UCL really to blame in this matter? Well yes if it educates according to the current values of our democracy. But as for the more sensible issue of evidence of some solid form of “incitement of hatred or violence” putting UCL on notice to act, we’ll have to wait and see. True, wait and see also for evidence of the mechanisms put in place by universities to be sufficiently receptive of this – and in addition, wait and see for evidence that universities should have read the circumstances as requiring any changes in approach. Though not also wait, I hope, for the kind of fascist dogma some advocate as a necessary evil to assuage their basic fear of crime. Richard Walker 2010-02-11T19:26:30+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/child_prisoners_of_conscience/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/child_prisoners_of_conscience/ Elif A. is the latest inmate to be sent to the notorious prison in the major Kurdish metropolis of Díyarébekir in Turkey. Elif A. was arrested and is being tried for participating in a democracy march outside the headquarters of the Kurdish Political Party, the DTP, which was recently ´Shut down´ by Turkey. Elif A. had recently recieved her school report directly from the Secretary of State for Education for her 1st class achievements in the reputable Díyarébekir Secondary Grammar (Andolu Lyceé) School. She was by far the most successful student at the school. She is now in high security prison accused of unpatriotic thoughts and intentions. Elif A. is not the only child to have been arrested in Díyarébekir this year.  267 children aged between 12-18 have been charged and tried by the Turkish authorities in the city. These children are being accused of having undesirable political views that allegedly breach the Turkish state code of Unitarianism ‘Turkey belongs to the Turks’. These children have simply sought to express their most basic human rights, their Kurdish identity and the freedom of speech in Kurdish. Elif A. was exercising her democratic right of protest, which is in theory not illegal in Turkey because the country portrays itself as a ‘Democracy’. Turkey is a ‘Democracy’ where children as young as 12 are languishing in notorious prisons that are often shared with adults and serious offenders. Elif A. is being tried in an Adult High Security Criminal Court and the prosecutor is seeking 15 years imprisonment for Elif A. For the avoidance of doubt, Elif A. simply took part in a protest..for which she is facing 15 years in a notorious prison where torture was found to be widespread. The E type prison-high security- was so overwhelmed with the number of children, a new ward has now been built to house them. The adult ward had run out of beds. These children are prisoners of conscience. The Turkish authorities are unlikely to show mercy without the international pressure. These children are likely suffer humiliation and torture. It is with great concern that I relate the injustice faced by these children who are tried in adult courts and often made to share cells with adults in high security prisons. These children are innocent and their only crime is their aspirations for the fundamental human rights that most children take for granted. The European Union cannot and must not remain silent when such gross violations take place at its doorstep in a country that EU hopes to welcome as a member. This matter needs urgent attention. Elif.A and her peers should be in school, not prison. International 2010-02-04T12:21:34+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/american_invasion_by_default/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/american_invasion_by_default/ Haiti è di nuovo “americana” Haiti is once again “American” in the words of Il Manifesto writer Maurizio Matteuzzi. The Haitians have had their fair share intervention by the US. In fact only recently the US supported coup removed Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 after a short term in office, during the Clinton Administration, only to be reinstated on the terms of the then American administration in 1994. Aristide had promised his impoverished people prosperity and dignity prior to 1991. On this premise he was elected. It is a double tragedy that is being endured by the Haitians who have not only lost their loved ones and their livelihoods but also their sovereignty and independence for good. The Obama administration have promised aid; on the fourth day of the earthquake, ordinary Haitians still sleep beside those who have perished but have not been given the dignity of being covered, removed and buried. The Obama government is busy making plans about this newly arisen opportunity to invade Haiti and install thousands of US marines on Haitian soil. They have not ventured into the city due to security concerns. It appears US has to fully occupy and secure Haiti before it can safely put out its men to deliver aid. The hope of finding survivors is anything but lost, the injured remain untreated, the dead unburied, the children hungry and thirsty in the baking sun. The US aid is still on the tarmac of the airport. Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state is arriving today, presumably she will now extract more compromises from the broke president of Haiti before finally allowing the US men and women out there. Icelandair was one of the first airlines to land in Puerto-au-Prince with tons of aid. The Icelandic team was out helping out the Haitians in no time with their experience to deal with such difficult conditions. The Chinese did not waste time either. Now the US has the control of the airport , it can decide who lands and who does not? This is worrying because , the US is bound to abuse this newly gained authority to abuse the aid process to get back at Latin American leaders like Chavez and Evo Morales. This state of affairs is abhorrent to say the least when millions of people are homeless, psychologically scarred for life and desperate. The television pictures show a dignified and a patient people who have gone through the most devastating tragedy to befall them-they are not a security threat-they are ordinary human beings with pride and dignity- and must be treated with dignity. Their pride and dignity are warranted not least because they are the first black republic in the world but also their brave defiance of slavery-despite the French oppression and the compensation running into millions of dollars to the French Slave owners -this was paid by the most impoverished people, Haitians just to be free and independent. Their freedom , human rights and independence must be respected by the US government and its first black president. Further reading: (1) Google News: Anger at US builds at Port-au-Prince airport (2) ABC News Australia: Aristide maintains he was kidnapped from Haiti (3) Google News: Haiti’s first lady says ‘my country will make it’ International 2010-01-17T11:46:03+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/freedom_of_expression_ucl_and_the_detroit_bomb_plot/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/freedom_of_expression_ucl_and_the_detroit_bomb_plot/ Much criticism of UCL has flowed from the Detroit Bomb Plot, and of the UCL Islamic Society in particular. Many in the media have called for higher levels of control on the activities of such organisations, but it must be realised that this is not the solution. Solutions address causes, and the University is not itself a cause. Some have accused the university environment of being a breeding ground for radicals, and I cannot honestly dispute this: wherever many great minds come together, radical ideas will surface. The vast majority of these, however, are revolutionary advancements in technology, science, political thought and so on; not religious extremism. Moreover, it is precisely through engaging in frank and open debate that young people are able to challenge their own preconceptions in a safe environment; to rationalise and order their initial reactions to the world around them and to understand the opposing views. After all, that is what education is. To compromise this facility by imposing limitations on the activities of student groups would undoubtedly do more harm than good. Certainly pushing such ideas underground would intensify any levels of extremism, but much more than that - outside that - it would lead to the isolation of thousands of young people, left as they would be without satisfactory means of expression and academic exploration. Indeed, such isolation has seemingly been a key factor in the Detroit Plot. Freedom of expression is not à la carte; we cannot pick and choose what we want - within the bounds of the law, it is a wholesale option. The law rightly sets some absolute boundaries, but to impose further restrictions on student organisations would be disastrous. This is a testing moment for our society, and I close by harking back to Voltaire: Je ne suis pas d’accord avec un mot de ce que vous dites, mais je me battrai jusqu’à la mort pour votre droit de le dire. If we cannot defend free expression now, then the notion is utterly meaningless. Fiona Whiteside President UCL Student Human Rights Programme International 2010-01-09T07:58:13+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/we_hold_these_truths/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/we_hold_these_truths/ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was one of us. He was President of the UCL Islamic Society between 2006 and 2007. This is not the place to analyze why and how Umar did what he did. Now is the time to remember certain basic truths. On campus we are blessed by the opportunities given by one of the best universities in the world. UCL is by tradition a place of radicals and free thinkers. It was born out the idea of a group of rebellious students. When Campbell and Brougham (two of the founders of the University of London) began to organize a university for London, the only existing universities in England were those long established at Oxford and Cambridge. The “two great public nuisances”, Bentham called them, “storehouses and nurseries of political corruption”. Membership of the Church of England was required for admission to the one and for graduation to the other. All non conformists were excluded. UCL was the first university to open the door for people of race, religion, gender with no discrimination. This why the UCL SHRP could have born only at UCL.We undoubtedly posses nowadays an higher degree of freedom. Let’s not waste it, and let’s remember that freedom carries with itself a great degree of responsibility. We hold certain truths: that respect for every other human being is a fundamental tenet of the political morality of a Liberal Democracy, that women are to be treated equally, that we are free to chose our own way of life. That in the light of our best tradition, we all ought to respect every other human being and that the responsibility for what happen in our classroom remains, first of all, on the respect of these basic fundamental values. This is what UCL stands for. Editorial 2010-01-04T13:05:24+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/democracy_or_military_junta/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/democracy_or_military_junta/ Turkey is unqiue in the way it portrays itself; a beacon of democracy in the Middle-East/Eastern Europe. It is also the only country to have secured the status of a candidate to join the EU with the De Facto Military dictatorship. Turkey may be a succesful diplomatic player in pursuading the international community of its glossed over dubious and highly cencored democratic facade, but it is failing miserably to uphold the most fundamental human rights of millions of its Kurdish citizens. The racism and ethnic discrimination against the Kurdish population is sanctioned by the Republic Of Turkey where the military are in charge not only of the executive but also the judiciary. The only remaining mouth-piece for millions of Kurds, the Democratic People’s Party, DTP , was banned in Turkey last week. This party had 21 democratically elected members in the country’s parliament, two of the senior MPs-including the leader- have been banned from political activity for 5 years. Barack Obama met the leader of DTP during one of his first visits abroad in Turkey. He had given support to the promotion of democracy for the Kurds and peace in their region. It is ironic that the Party is shut down the same week Barack Obama recieved his Nobel Peace Prize. The 21 MPs have pledged to withdraw from the country’s parliament where the Kurdish voice is banned , Kurdish representation annihilted and betrayed. This has already had serious repurcussions that has derailed the proposed peace talks between the Turkish Government and Kurdish PKK to end the decades old conflict in the region. Turkey has proven once more that it is not genuine and that it will curtail the Kurdish freedoms and human rights as and when it deems proper in complete breach of its obligations as a candidate member to join the EU but also as a democracy. Turkish democracy was already diminished by the countless abuses it inflicted upon its Kurdish population but the closure of the Kurdish Political Party -the 10th Kurdish party to be banned in Turkey- will surely bring out the ugly face that lies under Turkish holiday brochures. Democracy 2009-12-14T15:35:02+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/zaynab_jalalian_letter_worlds_conscience/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/zaynab_jalalian_letter_worlds_conscience/ Zaynab Jalalian’s Letter to the world’s Conscience, 01/12/2009 > crossposted from KurdishMedia.com KNC - North America The Kurdish woman, Ms. Zaynab Jalalian, who has been sentenced to death by the Iranian government, spends her remaining time at a prison in Sanandaj in Kurdistan-Iran. In the letter Ms. Jalalian secretly sent out on Friday, November 27, 2009, asks human/women’s rights activists to campaign on her behalf and support her. Below is her letter translated into English. Dear… I am a twenty-seven year Kurdish woman who has been sentenced to death by the Iranian Judiciary authority for my political activities. After I was given death sentence last year I appealed and my case was reviewed by the Iranian High Court. The High Court sustained the lower court’s decision. I am under constant torture and humiliation. I was put on an orchestrated trial without a legal representation and after a few minutes I was sentenced to death. I don’t have a lawyer to defend me. The Court only dedicated a few minutes to my case. The Court told me that I was an “Enemy of God,” and in a short period of time all enemies of God would be hanged. All the judges in my trial voted for my execution. I asked the Judge if I could say good-bye to my mother. He told me “shut up.” The Judge rejected my appeal and refused to let me to see my mother. Since I cannot defend myself, I ask all advocates and activists of human/women’s rights to campaign on my behalf and support me. I need your help. Zaynab Jalalian Translated by Kurdish National Congress of North America KNC - North America 01/12/2009 00:00:00 Democracy 2009-12-03T01:15:57+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/racial_hate_speech_what_are_we_so_afraid_of/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/racial_hate_speech_what_are_we_so_afraid_of/ I’m sure many of us, (including myself) watched the episode of ‘Question Time,’ (which was aired on 22.10.09), with barely concealed glee.  The witty retorts from Bonnie Greer, (renowned author), against the leader of the BNP, Nick Griffin, was a pleasure to watch. Observing the range of opinions, and the openness with which they were expressed, should make us appreciate that freedom of expression is a truly amazing thing.  However at the back of my mind, I can feel doubt surreptitiously creeping in at the edges.  Can we have too much of a good thing? It is not what was said during the Question Time episode that captured my interest, (well, not entirely), but the reaction of the public to it, and the intensity of that reaction.  When, the issue of race gets mentioned, we are forced to confront a cornucopia of opinion, from extreme polarised and partisan positions, to complete disinterest.  This was evident throughout the public uproar surrounding the inclusion of Mr Griffin on the popular BBC show. Calls for the BNP leader to be banned from the discussion programme were made by prominent individuals such as the home secretary, Alan Johnson.  In addition, special interest organisations, such as Unite against Fascism, vehemently protested the presence of Nick Griffin, on the programme. They organised an anti-BNP demonstration, which resulted in approximately 16 coaches of people turning up.  Evidently, the reaction to potentially racist speech is clearly intense and multifaceted. However, the remarks of Chris Keates, the general secretary of the NASUWT, (the largest British teachers union) are particularly intriguing.  He stated that the BNP should not be given a ‘platform to promote racial hatred, intolerance and violence.’ It is within this statement that we are confronted with the unfortunate dilemma that exists within modern liberal Western democracies. How do we accommodate or address racist political beliefs?  Is the answer to completely ostracise these types of groups, or should we embrace them as part of the fabric of our society?  Ultimately, how do we draw the appropriate balance between the hated and the haters?  Recourse to Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, tells us that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression.’ In the case of Jersild v. Denmark, the Commission also accepted that recognition of Article 10, may also include the dissemination of racist ideas.  The overriding idea from Europe, is that of acceptance, and it is these types of ideals that should become concrete within British society.  The beliefs of organisations such as the BNP should not be sidelined, simply because they are substantially different to the values upon this country has come to cherish, such as acceptance, tolerance and equality. Racist speech may make us feel uncomfortable, uneasy, and possibly even create feelings of self-loathing amongst the affected groups.  However, the answer does not lie in burying our heads in the sands.  Hiding away from certain beliefs does not mean they go away.  It only means we do not hear them. A policy of ‘I hear nothing, I see nothing, I know nothing,’ merely serves the interests of those who want to spread and breed, fear and distrust.  This is because it allows their views to go unchallenged.  Democracy is (in part) based on debate.  For those of us who wish to become part of the public forum, direct forms of democracy encourage us to actively participate in open discourse.  The possibility of hurt feelings (or perhaps more), should not deter people from action. Furthermore, I think people are fearful about the possible impact on wider society. There is a possibility that not penalising racist speech will further marginalise and dehumanise certain minority groups. There is also the lingering question of whether Britain has truly moved on from a time where signs of “no blacks, no dogs, no Irish,” were a normal feature of certain pubs and hotels.  Does allowing the BNP to openly state their views mean that Britain has not changed for the better? Barack Obama told the world that “change has come to America,” but has any ‘real’ change come to Britain?  The answer is of course it has!  The signs came down a long time ago, and ethnic minorities have become an increasingly prominent part of the British landscape.  There have even been signs of the emergence of our own ‘Barack Obama’ type figures in the form of Lewis Iwu, (the first black president of the Oxford Union), and the Honourable Mrs Justice Dobbs DBE.  She became the first non-white High Court judge in October 2004. However, while these people represent a new age of racial acceptance and equality, their existence does not take away from the fact that we are still left with the problem of how to deal with organisations like the BNP.  It is not enough to speak of encouraging people to challenge racist views.  This fails to take into account, the practical realities of today’s society and the disadvantages suffered by some marginalised communities.  They may lack the opportunity to make their voices heard.  Fear of reprisal, of ‘rocking the boat,’ and even appearing overly argumentative are just a few examples of how people can be implicitly pushed into submission.  In addition, the possibility of tokenism or only being a symbol of racial tolerance, (as an ‘acceptable face of brown’), offers the possibility of further humiliation by ignoring meritocratic principles.  These types of ‘quick fix’ responses to racial hate speech are actually pandering to groups such as the BNP, because it relegates minority groups to subordinate positions.  Perhaps, the actual ‘fear’ surrounding racial hate speech lies in the ambiguous nature of how to effectively help people get their voices heard, without the worry that negative responses will follow.  What society needs to be is unafraid.  Unafraid of engaging with extremist groups and, unafraid of having to face challenges that force us to recognise that not everyone is willingly embracing diversity with open arms. Modern Culture 2009-11-25T13:56:28+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/comments_or_feedback_on_our_blog_let_us_know_what_you_think/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/comments_or_feedback_on_our_blog_let_us_know_what_you_think/ It being a time of change and transition at the UCL SHRP, we are always keen for feedback from all readers and surfers alike - current members, old ones, and of course interested observers and online commentators. Has the our blog been as incisive and informative as we had planned, or are there ways that we can make it better?Comments and suggestions are most welcome - so please feel free in posting them in the space below or by emailing . Many thanks in advance! Tony Do you fancy joining the new bloggers for human rights team that the programme? Want to blog posts on human rights and provide your analysis on news, events and all things rights related on a regular basis? Contact for more information on getting started with the 2009/2010 team. SHRP News 2009-11-19T23:38:57+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/the_human_rights_act_to_be_or_not_to_be/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/the_human_rights_act_to_be_or_not_to_be/ Crossposted from progressive Conservative blog Platform 10 >>written by Qudsi Rashid on 3rd November, 2009 (in a personal capacity). The Conservatives have advocated a British Bill of Rights to replace the Human Rights Act (HRA). Cameron and Grieve have both recently made this clear. I’m still not sure why.  If a Bill of Rights is to replace the HRA, it follows that there must be something wrong with the HRA that a Bill of Rights would remedy. So, if we are going to be intellectually honest in this exercise, rather than politically Machiavellian, then we need to point out specific problems with the HRA that need to be fixed. Surely a true Conservative must eschew change for change’s sake. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it (or however Burke put it more elegantly than that). But this is where the problems start for the Conservatives. There is not only a lack of coherence with many of the arguments put forward against the HRA, but indeed there is a lack of consistency within the Party itself. Let’s start with the substance of the rights protected by the HRA. As Grieve put it recently at a JUSTICE fringe meeting at the Party Conference, there is not much a right-minded person (and indeed I would add, a right-minded Tory) could disagree with. But part of the problem for the Party is the tension between the libertarians and the authoritarians. The Chris Graylings out there want less rights and more wrongs; David Davis and the libertarians want extra protections (i.e. rights) for the individual to protect him or her from the state. Somehow these conflicting interests need to be reconciled, a point recently highlighted by Henry Porter for the Guardian. As far as the form of rights enforcement goes, criticism has been levied against the HRA that it gives too much power to unelected judges at the expense of Parliament. First of all, it is clear that Parliament has failed us when it comes to protecting us from an over-bearing Executive. So yes, Parliament should have a greater role in rights protection. But that has nothing to do with the HRA. It has to do with a lack of proper legislative scrutiny by Parliament. Laws (and as such rights) need to be interpreted. That is the role of judges. In any country that abides to the principles of liberalism, democracy, and the separation of powers (as we do) there must be continual dialogue between legislators and judges. The HRA provides for this whilst maintaining the Conservative foundational value of parliamentary supremacy. One mustn’t forget that unlike many other countries, judges in the UK have no strike-down power to invalidate legislation. At most, they can simply declare that laws are contrary to human rights standards. It remains for Parliament to decide what should be done (if anything) to remedy this. It is true that the HRA has come under some criticism in the popular press. But the stories about how the HRA has defied common-sense, has unjustifiably let criminals go free, has hindered the fight against terrorism and so on, are almost all untrue. Dennis Nilsen never had a right to pornography; nor did the HRA prevent the police from having ‘Wanted’ posters, to name but just two such myths. It is disingenuous, and indeed wrong, that some politicians and journalists use lies and myths to trick the public. The only problem that I can see with the HRA itself is that it is perceived by some in society (and many within the Conservative Party) to be flawed. The question is whether or not this is a sufficient reason to replace it with a Bill of Rights. A ‘copy and paste job’ with a change of title may be a huge waste of effort, time and money. To me, this seems a classic case of smoke with no fire. The HRA may have been misunderstood and even misapplied by some officials. This however does not make the case for the wholesale dismantling of a perfectly good piece of legislation. If anything, there should be better education about the Act – maybe this is what a Conservative government could focus their efforts on. This issue is not and should not be a party political one. All liberal democracies have constitutional protection of rights – many have them placed in written Constitutions such that they are to a degree immune from political tinkering on popular whims. We don’t have such a system in place. And so, it is fundamentally important that this debate over a Bill of Rights does not descend into a game of party political football. There would be nothing worse than having a Conservative Bill of Rights, followed by a Labour one 8 years down the line. The fabric of our constitution is fragile. We must not start picking at its seams simply for political capital. If the debate is to be had, it must be done honestly and with integrity. We must reject our prejudices. We must reject the popular political manoeuvring over the issue, often based on lies and myths. We must distil the arguments and focus on specific problems with the HRA. Jesse Norman and Peter Oborne have recently published a pamphlet making the Conservative case for the HRA. I would strongly recommend that all Conservatives read it, to come to their own conclusions about the merits of any repeal of the HRA. The HRA ought not to be a major battlefield between the parties, but there is the danger that the Conservative Party will make it into one. There is, however, still time to rethink this. If the HRA is not actually as bad as it is sometimes made out to be, we may in fact be better off sticking with it. Posted by Administrator, on behalf of Qudsi Rasheed, writing in his personal capacity.  Qudsi is a Legal Officer at JUSTICE, the all-party law-reform and human rights organisation. Democracy 2009-11-17T15:58:47+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/the_human_rights_act_will_the_tories_do_away_with_it/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/the_human_rights_act_will_the_tories_do_away_with_it/ Cross-posted from The Times Online on 21st October >> Frances Gibb (Legal Editor) provides a balance sheet on the Human Rights Act and a British Bill of Rights, facing down Conservative gestures of throwing away the Act and considers Keir Starmer’s recent highly politicized remarks defending the HRA. It was good knockabout stuff. Dominic Grieve, QC, the Shadow Justice Secretary, v Lord (Charlie) Falconer of Thoroton, on the subject of the Human Rights Act. Grieve was said to be a lone voice who had to attempt to please the party faithful while speaking from a different hymn sheet to his audience of liberal lawyers, Lord Falconer said. The former Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary was accused, in turn, of seeing onto the statute book an act that had failed to protect society from “one of the most authoritarian periods of government”. But the debate this week held by Doughty Street Chambers, a fund-raising event for Leukaemia Research in memory of Mr Justice (Henry) Hodge, was also a useful pre-election skirmish. The Human Rights Act 1998 was hailed as a flagship reform of the New Labour Government. Instead, it has become something of an albatross, scorned and derided as a criminals’ charter. Both main parties have pledged reform — and there have been mutterings in some (Conservative) quarters of doing away with it altogether. Grieve admits that he was in a minority within the Conservatives in favouring the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. His colleagues feared the marginalisation of Parliament and growth of a judiciary fuelled human rights culture. Ten years on, were they right? What the Act had not done, he told his audience of lawyers, was to protect society from “one of the most authoritarian periods of government” that had seen proposals for 42-day detention before trial, ID cards, databases and the growth of the surveillance state. “On all this the Human Right Act was mostly silent.” He accepted the myths it had spawned — such as the need to give protesting prisoners pizza or Dennis Nilsen, the convicted killer, pornography. But authorities could also hide behind it. “We shouldn’t assume that it has been all sweetness and light. In some areas it has been very damaging.” The original aim had been to give the judiciary wide discretion as to how far to follow the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. But many judges had followed it closely, creating problems, he said. “This was meant to bring rights home but that is not the public perception. It’s that rights are being imposed.” Yet supporters of the Act can take comfort from Grieve’s plans. First, he insists that his party has no intention of pulling out of the European Convention, “however inconvenient the decisions made under the Act seem to be”. “It is not [David Cameron’s] policy, nor that of any rational person.” Nor was there any intention to scrap or derogate from the prohibition on deporting people to countries where they may be tortured. “It’s not going to happen. It can’t happen and it will not.” But a new Bill of Rights, building on the Human Rights Act but tailor-made for Britain, could provide plenty of scope for rebalancing the Act towards public protection. What would it include? Core constitutional principles, he said, including “beefing up the role of Parliament” and protecting the right to trial by jury. So far, so good. Much of it, as Lord Falconer said, was “very encouraging, if very surprising”. Will, though, Grieve carry his party? “Dominic Grieve is our best hope [among the Conservatives] for the protection of human rights,” he said. “I genuinely believe that. You should meet the others.” Grieve says that he did not intend to make changes to the Act but he needed to answer how he would square that with his constituents, Lord Falconer said. He accused Grieve of drawing on old incidents, of raising irrelevant cases and of pretending that the Act could be substantially refocused — when the reality was that it could not, while remaining signed up to it. There was a new Grieve/Dacre axis, he jibed — a reference to the Daily Mail Editor’s attack over the Human Rights Act and the growth of privacy laws. And in a frolic of his own, Lord Falconer said that he would be in favour of extending human rights to “enforceable minimum rights” that would cover minimum standards in health, education and environmental protection. There was one ominous note in this general consensus as to the value of human rights. Grieve warned that public opinion was fickle and could change. There was an assumption that “the European Convention is here for keeps — that’s a bit optimistic”. By chance, last night the Director of Public Prosecutions threw his own views into the pot. He warned that scrapping the Human Rights Act would jeopardise victims of crime. Keir Starmer, QC, a human rights barrister himself from Doughty Street, said that calls to rebalance the criminal justice system, often after a “questionable decision that receives undue notoriety”, tended to come back to the Human Rights Act. But in the second annual Crown Prosecution Service lecture to be given in London tonight, Starmer says that “such loud headlines obscure the truth”. Stripping defendants of their rights would do nothing to “promote the dignity and respect of victims”. He went on: “It would be to this country’s shame if we lost the clear and basic statement of our citizens’ human rights provided by the Human Rights Act on the basis of a fundamentally flawed analysis of their origin and relevant to society.” The Doughty Street debate indicates otherwise, despite electioneering. And it raised some funds. It was the idea of Gavin Millar, QC, and Alastair Campbell, his brother-in-law and former Blair spindoctor, with Gerald Shamash, the Labour Party solicitor. It was Campbell who floated the idea of raising £50,000, in Hodge’s memory, for Leukaemia Research on his website and the event raised some £10,000 towards that. Hodge — a radical lawyer and passionate believer in human rights all his life — would have been pleased.  Democracy 2009-11-03T14:43:24+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/statement_by_navanethem_pillay_unhchr_human_rights_diplomacy_an_oxymoron/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/statement_by_navanethem_pillay_unhchr_human_rights_diplomacy_an_oxymoron/ Cross posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay digs her heels into a masterclass on engaging human rights and the many channels open to individuals and groups seeking to use human rights based approaches in their advocacy work for social change. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 28 October 2009 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here today and to speak again at my US alma mater. My address is entitled: “Human Rights Diplomacy: An Oxymoron?” I hope that I will manage to inspire many of the students here to take up human rights advocacy, on a pro bono basis if you pursue other career paths in the legal profession. As both a former judge and a former activist I have alternated between the deliberate pace of legal proceedings and the passion of public advocacy. As High Commissioner for Human Rights, I pursue both. I am also finding my way through a third course of action, which is private diplomacy. Unlike legal proceedings and public advocacy, diplomacy often takes place behind the scenes. It is a powerful tool, but often its power is not visible. Today I want to share with you a few preliminary reflections on the role of diplomacy in the protection and promotion of human rights. Last year we celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of perhaps the greatest achievement of human rights diplomacy, that is, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We look back with admiration at the determination that led to the formulation and adoption of the Universal Declaration in 1948. All too often, however, we underplay the intense negotiations, the well-honed diplomatic skills, the hotly debated options and quietly found compromises, and ultimately, the intergovernmental efforts and willingness to find common ground that ultimately sustained international agreement on the Declaration. Since then, human rights diplomacy has pursued two very different, but mutually reinforcing paths: on the one hand, we have witnessed the development of international law through which States willingly assumed human rights obligations and the formulation and continuing expansion of a system of human rights monitoring including by treaty bodies, special procedures mandate holders, complaint procedures, and now the Universal Periodic Review procedure of the Human Rights Council. On the other hand, we have seen the growth and impact of the international human rights movement, which through committed advocacy has often been instrumental in pressing recalcitrant governments to embrace in law, and implement in practice, internationally recognized human rights principles. At times, this advocacy has been conducted behind the scenes by civil society groups, including human rights defenders and international organizations, as well as through the peer pressure of sympathetic governments. This quiet diplomacy operates on the principle of engagement, with persuasion and sometimes the prospect of more public advocacy as its primary tools. Sometimes human rights nongovernmental organizations and other champions of the human rights cause have adopted a highly visible strategy of “naming and shaming” those who commit human rights violations. Some would regard this strategy and diplomacy as antithetical. But there is no doubt that exposing human rights violations and calling perpetrators to account publicly has produced remarkable results, often engendering positive change both domestically and internationally. Public advocacy can work independently of or in tandem with quiet diplomacy, as well as with judicial and quasi-judicial human rights mechanisms. To better put into context how human rights diplomacy in all its articulations has developed in the last few decades, allow me to discuss briefly the historical background that shaped it. The end of the cold war in the early 1990’s had fuelled hopes for a “gentler, kinder” world in international relations. Yet subsequently, in fact within a mere three-year span, war in the former Yugoslavia, in Somalia, and the Rwandan genocide in 1994 shattered those hopes. The 1990s was also the decade that witnessed a radical transformation in the conduct of war, and indeed the “privatization” of conflict. Rather than confrontations among States, most of the so-called small wars of the decade were marked by the violent internal competition between either State forces and well-armed rebels, or conflict between different militia of non-state actors in control of large swaths of territory, natural resources and weapons. The suppliers of weapons and the beneficiaries of profits from natural resources fuelling some of these wars were also private individuals or businesses that were callously unconcerned with the human rights record and the rapacity of their customers. Tragically, the victims of these conflicts were increasingly also “private” individuals, civilians caught between the contenders or deliberately targeted by belligerents. Widespread, gross and systematic human rights violations recurred in virtually all of these conflicts. Crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and even genocide also tragically marked that decade. But these were also the years in which large-scale humanitarian and human rights-oriented advocacy campaigns led by like-minded States, international organizations and nongovernmental activists were launched in response to the atrocities. Such campaigns included the movement to ban landmines and the use of child soldiers, and to control the misuse and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. At that time, the framework for international justice developed significantly, with the creation of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and ultimately with the campaign that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. I was privileged to serve in the Rwanda Tribunal and the ICC, in both cases from their first days of infancy, thrown into action and trying desperately to meet the great challenges and high expectations surrounding their creation. And it is well-known that these groundbreaking advances in international criminal justice are largely due to the efforts of civil society. It is against this background that the post of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was created in 1993, much as a result of public human rights advocacy at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, and since then the Office of the High Commissioner has progressively expanded its operations. With regard to diplomacy, our efforts have unfolded both “internally” and “externally”; both proactively and reactively; both publicly and quietly; and both as a stand-alone outreach strategy and in partnership. As you probably know, human rights are enshrined in the UN Charter as a fundamental purpose of the organization. Every department and agency in the UN system has its own unique mandate and focus, but all share a stated commitment to common values, including human rights and gender equality. The World Summit of 2005 articulated the need to promote human rights, development and security simultaneously. Embracing such recognition, in the same year the World Summit doubled the OHCHR budget empowering us to expand our areas of intervention and strengthen our ranks and advocacy. Indeed, we have come a long way in terms of mainstreaming human rights within the UN system. There has been notable progress in the peace and security pillar, in terms of human rights components of UN integrated missions for peacekeeping, and in the emergence of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine from the 2005 World Summit which enjoins States to protect civilians from the worst abuses. When the concept of responsibility to protect was first enunciated against the backdrop of the Rwandan genocide and the war in the former Yugoslavia, there was widespread reluctance to embrace it. Doubts were raised about the legitimacy of the ways and means of external intervention to be carried out, possibly against the wishes of a sovereign State. Objections, however, could not persuasively counter the inherent soundness of this concept which is anchored in the fundamental notion of civilian inviolability. As a result, the concept continued to make significant inroads in international thought, and it was finally endorsed by the World Summit. Norms and pledges, however, are good only if their full implications are understood and effectively applied in practice. There is no doubt that the full potential of the protection norm is still far from being realized. In that doctrine UN institutions have an important role to play, in interpreting and applying the norm, and in helping States to discharge their responsibility. Increased interaction with the UN Security Council is of vital importance to promote and protect human rights. In particular, it is crucial that the Security Council— in its efforts to prevent conflict, re-establish peace and security, guide peace negotiations and post-conflict peace building and recovery processes—envisages the effective integration of the protection of human rights in all phases of a transition. These phases span from peace negotiations to the restoration of normalcy, to the creation of institutions and the provision of justice. In this regard, OHCHR has assisted and will continue to support the efforts of the international community. Equally important is progress in the development pillar in order to build capacity and effective institutions on the ground. This requires a committed and far-sighted active engagement by all concerned partners. An increasing number of agencies have adopted human rights-based approaches and integrated human rights into their policies and programmes. In so doing, they have brought a sharper focus on human rights into UN-supported national development efforts, and are thus better equipped to understand the needs and rights of the most marginalised and excluded. The recent food, financial and economic crises starkly highlighted the critical vulnerabilities that stem from violations of human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights. Many if not most of the UN Development Assistance Frameworks developed by UN country teams and endorsed by the respective Governments in recent years have reflected ‘nationally owned’ and internationally recognised human rights to maximize results. Program implementation has also benefited from the adoption of a human rights-based approach, particularly with regard to the attainment of economic, social and cultural rights, including access to food, water, housing, health and education. While progress remains uneven, these achievements deserve recognition. To be sure, the universal membership, multilateral character, neutrality and legitimacy of the United Nations provide unique comparative advantages in this field, helping to address recipient countries’ fears that human rights are merely another form of donor ‘conditionality.’ But in all honesty I must tell you that this mainstreaming of human rights is not always easy. I am often astonished at the resistance to and fear of human rights. From the Security Council to the UN Country Teams that operate on the ground, there is an ongoing reluctance to embrace human rights mainly driven by perceived need to accommodate the sensitivities of member states. We must address this head on if we are to make significant progress. A potentially invaluable vehicle for the enhancement of UN synergy is the Human Rights Council, which is the intergovernmental body created in 2006 as a successor to the Commission on Human Rights, which had attracted growing criticism. The Council is virtually a standing body. The frequency of its meetings—both in formal and informal gatherings—may thus create more opportunities to better hone operations and responses to both chronic human rights conditions and sudden crises. This may also help to build a firmer ground of understanding among the Council’s members than sporadic or less frequent interactions allowed for. An example of this added value is offered by the thematic and country-specific special sessions of the Human Rights Council, which help throw a timely light on situations of concern. Crucially, the new Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, designed to examine the human rights record of all States, seeks to overcome the perceived selectivity and regional confrontations of the former Commission on Human Rights when considering national human rights situations. As the experience of the review has shown, States have conscientiously prepared their national reports through broad consultations with relevant stakeholders, including civil society. To date, 80 States have been reviewed. As result of this process, various countries under review firmly pledged to strengthen implementation of human rights standards at the national level, as well as their cooperation with human rights mechanisms. If used effectively, the UPR can help address implementation gaps and contribute to building capacity on the ground. My Office services the human rights mechanisms, such as special procedures and human rights treaty bodies. The former are entrusted to examine, investigate, monitor, advise and publicly report on human rights situations worldwide. Through their direct contacts with Governments, their public statements, their reports to the Human Right Council and to the General Assembly, as well as informal briefings, the special procedures experts can offer invaluable information for identifying both preventive and corrective measures to address situations of concern and enhance practical implementation strategies on the ground. Through their recommendations, the treaty bodies provide states with guidance for national implementation of their obligations. Their work, including general comments on various provisions of the treaties, is also used by courts and other judicial bodies in the development of jurisprudence on international human rights law, as well as providing important substantive information for consideration in the UPR process. It is easy to get caught up in the world of the United Nations, yet I believe that we must always be guided in our priorities and all our efforts to promote and protect human rights by conditions on the ground, where violent conflict, discrimination, poverty, injustice and repression persist in too many parts of the world. Indeed, no country can claim a spotless record on human rights. Moreover, long-standing or emerging global problems, such as climate change, epidemics, shortages of resources including water and food, as well as the current financial crises and economic recession compound situations of entrenched vulnerability and hardship that preclude the full enjoyment of rights. The measure of our success in my view is the difference we make in the lives of women and men around the world. In my current role as High Commissioner for Human Rights, as I mentioned earlier, I am now called on to be a diplomat and to use the power of diplomacy to further human rights. I find myself often in a highly politicized context that contrasts starkly with my experience as a judge. I have carried over into my diplomatic endeavors all my judicial instincts. I do not rank rights and I use my office as a venue where everyone will be given a fair audience. I have called publicly, repeatedly, for a single standard of human rights to which all states should be held equally accountable. In the United Nations this is a challenge, but as I believe that the credibility of my Office depends on impartiality, I believe the credibility of other human rights undertakings similarly depends on impartiality. What I find is that when you move from treaty bodies, comprised of experts serving in their individual capacity, to bodies such as the Human Rights Council, comprised of political representation, ensuring that political considerations do not enter into the dialogue is a great challenge. It certainly helps to have a system such as the Universal Periodic Review, which ensures that each country will be examined, but I have seen some countries undergoing review stack the list of speakers in their support. In contrast, some states have welcomed the opportunity to openly discuss their internal challenges as well as their achievements, and I am hopeful that their vision of this review process ultimately prevails. In this context there is much room for quiet diplomacy. A case in point, and in fact a case-study, in such human rights diplomacy was the review conference against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance which took place in April 2009 in Geneva. The conference wrapped up with wide agreement in which 182 States undertook to prevent, prohibit and respond to all manifestations of racism and intolerance. But such consensus was hardly a foregone conclusion. A number of voices advocated a boycott of the review conference for well over a year, long before a single word was put to paper. This opposition was for the most part based on fears that the Geneva meeting would trigger a repetition of the virulent anti-Semitic activities of some non-governmental organizations at the margins of the 2001 World Conference in Durban. The odious actions of a few had tainted the reputation of the entire process from Durban in 2001 to the conference in Geneva in 2009. In the end, ten UN Member States, including the United States, decided to stay away from the Geneva gathering which the UN General Assembly had called to review the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the final document of the 2001 conference. From the outset, rather than focussing on the surrounding political controversies, my Office sought to engage all Member States by providing technical input and specific proposals. These were grounded in the well-established jurisprudence and practice of human rights mechanisms, such as Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures. At the same time, we began a wide range of consultations to gather the views of governmental and nongovernmental interlocutors, at the national, regional and international level. We did so at each and every phase of the drafting, negotiating and the deliberating processes involving the outcome document, the final say of the review conference. My Office played a role in facilitating resolution of the difficult issue of “defamation of religion” by organizing a workshop six months before the conference to look at the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 19 and 20 on incitement to racial hatred, as an alternative framework, based on international law, a framework that ultimately prevailed and was adopted in the Outcome Document. We also honed and stepped up our communications strategies by reaching out to wider audiences and empowering them to be informed and have a say well in advance of events. Our communications strategy succeeded because it was intrinsically linked to our substantive initiatives and was effective in countering misinformation. We also offered victims opportunities to speak directly of their plight and thus inform the general public. Nongovernmental organizations were given a credible, open and democratic platform to express their views with zero tolerance for disrespectful outbursts. Despite some isolated instances of intemperate behaviour on the part of a handful of NGOs, there was no repetition of the odious slurs and confrontation that had marked the Durban conference. In the end, the Durban Review Conference provided a platform for a new beginning. The few States that chose to stay away should now evaluate the Outcome Document adopted by the conference on its own merit and substance. Many of these States participated in its drafting and were part of the emerging consensus up until the very eve of the conference. This is why I am hopeful that they will rejoin international efforts to combat racism and intolerance worldwide. Let me conclude by saying that I have found diplomacy to be an effective and for me a new component to what is I believe a more holistic approach to human rights protection. In addition to building a rapid response capacity for human rights crises, which may often require public advocacy, I think much more can be done to develop a long term prevention strategies that include a focus on the institutional capacity of states to respond when human rights are at risk. I am a firm believer in speaking out. I have and will continue to speak out strongly against human rights violations wherever they occur. At the same time, in my capacity as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, I look forward to greater dialogue and engagement with states, and will do my best to master the art of diplomacy to this end. Thank you.  Editor's Pick 2009-11-02T19:19:39+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/stephen_sedley_on_constitutional_moments/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/stephen_sedley_on_constitutional_moments/ What have The Wire, the unwritten constitution and the Human Rights Act all got in common? Cross-posted from the London Review of Books, Lord Justice Stephen Sedley reviews The New British Constitution by Vernon Bogdanor . There’s an episode of The Wire in which the intellectual drug baron Stringer Bell, trying to launder his gang’s profits by legitimate real estate development, finds the project stalled by bureaucratic delays. He is tactfully advised by his contractor that it takes money in the right place to get things moving. Bell is outraged; but, as the contractor explains, it’s ‘democracy in action’. The day after I had laughed aloud at this, I read that one of the London boroughs is considering introducing such a system: if you want your planning application dealt with promptly, it will cost you, while for everyone else the wait will get even longer. The difference is that this system will be entirely above board. Is it constitutional for a public authority to offer different standards of public service in return for premiums? Fifty years ago it might well have been doubted. But the postwar notion that the state provided service according to need, and that if queues formed they were not to be jumped, has given way to an entrepreneurial model in which, subject to a safety net at one level or another, you pay for what you get and you get what you pay for. Each concept has acquired constitutional legitimacy in its time – for, as John Griffith famously observed, the constitution is what happens. So when you pick up The New British Constitution and ask what new constitution that might be, one answer is that the British constitution, because it is always changing, is always new. But the veteran political scientist Vernon Bogdanor goes further. His thesis is that since the election of the Blair government in 1997 the pace and depth of constitutional change have increased to a point where a new shape of the state, though still fuzzy in outline and incomplete in detail, can be discerned and described with some confidence. Riskily, however, Bogdanor takes the cornerstone of the new constitution (the metaphor is his) to be the 1998 Human Rights Act. The sustained media assault on the act and on the European Convention on Human Rights which it patriates has scared ministers and shadow ministers alike into blaming the act for everything that goes wrong in the justice system. The Sun’s casual description of it (in a news story) as ‘the hated law which frees murderers to kill again’ has been internalised by the political culture to a point where the opposition has felt able to pledge repeal of the act without – so far – any firm indication of what will follow. Yet unless it withdraws from both the Council of Europe and the EU, the UK will still have its treaty obligation to respect the convention. Will the right of individual petition to the Strasbourg court be revoked? If a new code of rights and obligations is to replace it, will it be convention-minus, convention-plus or just convention-lite? Labour too is looking for ways of hedging or qualifying the convention. Only the Lib Dems seem inclined to defend it. Whatever happens next, Bogdanor’s cornerstone currently looks insecure. The edifice which he nevertheless sees rising up above it is a pretty ambitious one: no longer a parliamentary democracy in which ultimate power resides in a representative legislature but a popular democracy based on localised devolution of power, reflecting the individualism which both Thatcher and Blair have validated, fuelled by the participatory potential of information technology. And since, he argues, most of the big constitutional changes of our era have been statutory – the European Communities Act 1972, the Human Rights Act 1998 and so forth – it is no longer problematical to assemble what happens into a written constitution. Utopian or dystopian? It’s not simply that freezing the frame at an arbitrary point of time is a recipe for constitutional paralysis. It’s that, if change is in truth destined to go in the direction Bogdanor predicts, democracy will not necessarily be any richer or the way we are governed any better. Anybody with experience of community politics will know how vulnerable it is to demagogy, to sectional interests, to parochialism and, when big issues or money are involved, to hijacking. That may not make it any worse than what we now have, but it won’t make it a whole lot better. Bogdanor’s description of the political philosophy of individualism as ‘cutting power into pieces’ may be well chosen; but to say, as he does in the next breath, that this corresponds with the liberal concept of limited government is to make a very large set of assumptions. Bogdanor’s starting point is, as it has been for the whole of his generation of political scientists and my generation of constitutional lawyers, the writings of Bagehot and Dicey. Bagehot, in his bright and energetic prose, went out of his way to stress how little separation actually existed in mid-Victorian Britain between the executive and legislative powers of the state located in cabinet and Parliament. He was right to point it out but wrong to support it. The dominance of Parliament by ministers and their departments was and remains a major issue for parliamentarians. But Bagehot’s sound account of the organic nature of the constitution stood and stands in sharp contrast to Dicey’s iconic reverence for the arrangements he chose to see and describe. Leaving aside his xenophobic and counterfactual insistence that Britain, unlike France, had no body of administrative law, Dicey’s doctrine of parliamentary supremacism stood firm until Home Rule came up: then he changed his mind and argued that there were some things that even Parliament couldn’t do. This apart, Dicey’s was a classic endeavour to enshrine what happened (or what he claimed happened) as what ought always to happen, and Bogdanor is wise, arguably even generous, to describe Dicey’s account of the Victorian constitution as ‘perhaps … reasonably accurate’. His argument, however, is that that was then and that what has now happened has made much of it irrelevant. This is the clean break he needs if he is to make good his ‘new constitution’ thesis. But is it really there? The first turning point, Bogdanor suggests, was the enactment in 1972 of a UK statute making European Union law superior even to Parliament’s legislation. The statute has certainly operated at that radical level, but what is perhaps equally important is that it is no more than an act of Parliament and can still be repealed by a simple majority. That does not necessarily suggest a constitutional measure. Nor does the occasional use since 1975 of referendums, admittedly a measure of direct democracy even if heavily mediated by the way the question is put; nor the introduction of PR for European elections. But Bogdanor’s big argument is that since 1997 constitutional change has gone into overdrive. He lists 15 measures, starting with the withdrawal of the Treasury’s hand from the Bank of England’s monetary policy, and running through the devolution of major central powers, the increasing use of PR and the introduction of mayoral government, to the partial reform of the House of Lords, the Freedom of Information Act, the regulation of political parties and their funding, and the recasting of the judicial system. The last of these is without doubt a real shift in the shape of the constitution. The law lords this autumn cease to be members of the legislature and become a distinct supreme court. The umbilicus linking judiciary and cabinet has already been severed as the lord chancellor has ceased to be head of the judiciary and become a rank and file minister, and as an independent commission has taken over his role of appointing judges. But Bogdanor makes the cogent point that if, instead of the disorderly and protracted way in which these changes have been introduced, they had been carried out in a single methodical swoop, the arrival of a new constitutional order would have been all but undeniable. That may be; but it may equally be said that the very disorderliness of the process, the toe-in-the-water approach to reform of the upper house, the resort to referendums to decide whether cities shall have mayors, the use of PR for some elections but not others, are examples of much the same kind of organic development as Bagehot was describing. If one were determined to locate a constitutional moment between the Victorians and us, the postwar institution of the welfare state might be a stronger candidate, realigning as it did the relationship of state to individual and bringing as it did in its train the revival and reassertion of judicial oversight of executive and local government which remains one of the dominant features of the constitution (and which has very little to do, save in terms of subject matter, with the Human Rights Act). The high point of Bogdanor’s conspectus is also, through no fault of his, the most tantalising and least conclusive. It is now widely accepted, and Bogdanor does not dispute, that the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy is itself an artefact of the common law, growing out of the historic compromise between the three limbs of the crown – legislative, judicial and executive – which was reached in the course of the 17th century and has been developed in modern concepts of the rule of law. Off parade, one or two senior judges have in the past considered the consequent possibility that if parliamentary legislation were to violate fundamental constitutional norms it might be the duty of the courts to disapply it. But recently, on parade in the case challenging the hunting legislation, three of the law lords took the opportunity to spell it out. Bogdanor cites the storm warnings given by Lord Steyn, Lady Hale and Lord Hope. Hope, one of the Scottish law lords, said: ‘Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute … Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament … is being qualified.’ He went on to locate the ultimate constitutional control – Hart’s rule of recognition – in ‘the rule of law enforced by the courts’. (Bogdanor, in an interesting footnote, relates Scottish scepticism about the absoluteness of Parliament’s sovereignty to the longstanding view that the 1707 Act of Union left the Scottish legal system and Presbyterian church beyond the reach of Westminster.) This is potent and pregnant stuff. The outcome of the hunting ban case didn’t depend on it, but, not long before, the government had been forced to drop a clause in an asylum bill which would have shut off all judicial review and appeal to the courts. Ronald Dworkin in a lecture in Cambridge had called on the judges, if it was passed into law, to hold it unconstitutional and to treat it as invalid. His suggestion brought into sharp focus the allocation of power between Parliament and the courts, a polarity that Bogdanor identifies as the site of a potential constitutional crisis. For what would happen in real life if the higher courts treated such a withdrawal of their jurisdiction as unconstitutional, ignored it and allowed an asylum seeker’s appeal? The home secretary, not recognising their jurisdiction, would proceed with deportation, and the court would arraign him for contempt. How would it end? We do not know, and most of us would prefer not to find out. What is more, a constitutional moment of truth is nowhere near as imminent as Bogdanor suggests. He thinks there is a conflict, created by the Human Rights Act and developing at what he calls remarkable speed, between the judges on one side and government, Parliament and the people on the other. This is an analysis which owes more to tabloid journalism than to constitutional reality. The reality is that, without taking the last word away from Parliament, the Human Rights Act has given the courts a voice in determining the compatibility of legislation with the convention, and Parliament and government have had the wisdom to heed the courts’ advice on the relatively few occasions when it has been negative. The law lords’ holding that the indefinite detention of foreign nationals on security grounds was contrary to the convention was accepted – albeit through gritted teeth – and different legislation introduced. That is not conflict: it is part of a major constitutional shift, initiated not by the judges but by Parliament, by which the judicial functions of statutory interpretation and protection of fundamental rights have been dovetailed with the legislative process. Inevitably, the media’s badmouthing of the Human Rights Act has succeeded in obscuring this constitutional achievement, but it is a pity that Bogdanor buys into it. That there remain areas of law in which the judges are frustrated with Parliament (the proliferation and complexity of criminal justice statutes, for example) and others where ministers are fed up with judges (for example in areas of asylum law) is not a harbinger of crisis or breakdown: it’s what happens under the rule of law in a democracy. It might be otherwise if Bogdanor’s assertion that ‘the judiciary is the only one of the three branches of government to hold unchecked and unaccountable power’ were correct; but to believe this you would need never to have read a reasoned judgment, and to have forgotten that Parliament has not only final legislative power but sits on ethical questions as judge in its own cause. The still larger question, whether constitutional change has now acquired a critical mass or is simply happening as it always has done, may be less important than the fact that no constitution, except perhaps that of a moribund state, stands still, and that ours is and for some time has been, as Bogdanor says, changing before our eyes. The devolution of major state powers to Scotland in particular is a true constitutional change, both because it is in practice irreversible without the consent of the Scots and because it is capable of having opened the door to a unilateral declaration of independence. The changes to the judicial system are also probably irreversible, despite their not inconsiderable problems. The requirement to apply for all judicial posts is no doubt an advance on the tap on the shoulder from a lord chancellor who has been taking private soundings from senior judges – itself an advance on Lord Salisbury’s belief (cited by Bogdanor) that an unwritten law dictated ‘that party claims should always weigh very heavily in the disposal of the highest legal appointments’. But the self-promotion that applications involve does not necessarily reveal the best candidates. Nor has it done much so far to redress the imbalances on the bench of gender and ethnicity. This is not because the appointments commission has been less than conscientious in its efforts. It is because the legal profession itself does not give women and minorities the same chance to shine as their white male counterparts. The real stars probably shine anyway; but the critical difference is with the average – sometimes very average – white male practitioner who can still reach the upper tranche of the practising profession. You cannot constitutionalise this problem: it has legal aspects but it reaches deeper than any law. There is a further series of problems with recorderships – part-time judicial appointments. These are a requisite first step on the staircase to the bench, for which applications can now outnumber vacancies by a factor of 20 or more. The new system, recognising the hazards of self-promotion, moved from shortlisting on the basis of references, with its capacity for idiosyncrasy, to a tickbox system which had the effect of excluding good candidates with atypical CVs, and from there to shortlisting by examination. This too is proving problematic: barristers who are at or close to the peak of an intellectually exacting profession, and whom the judges they appear before know to be outstandingly able, are failing the examinations which allow them to be shortlisted for interview as potential recorders. The commission is yet again reviewing the system, for it would be ironic if a practice which, though indefensible in principle, delivered at least some of the goods had been replaced by a process which rewarded mediocrity at the expense of talent. The effect of the changes to the judicial system, like the effect of devolution, is thus neither prescribed nor predictable. What, however, any reformed constitution must surely contain is an acceptable template of parliamentary conduct, something which three centuries of self-regulation have failed to provide. The Committee on Standards in Public Life, whose proposals are awaited, has a great deal to think about. Will modifying the allowance system answer the underlying problem of a parliamentary salary which many think incommensurate with the status and responsibilities of an MP? Will enhancing the salary be an acceptable solution if second jobs and employed relatives continue to be tolerated? Then there are Parliament’s own composition and procedures. Should it continue to be possible for a single MP to sink private members’ bills which otherwise have the support of the whole house? Should a member of either house who has declared an interest be able, unlike a local councillor, to remain and vote? Are we ever going to resolve the West Lothian question? And what is to become of the upper house? Election of its members will, on a strategic level, deprive prime ministers of ultimate control of its composition, and on a political level may challenge the legitimacy of the Commons. Although ministers have now settled on a four-fifths elected chamber, on what basis are the members to be elected? If after 12 years of proposals and withdrawals we still do not know, it may be less because of political hesitancy than because the issue is genuinely intractable. Bogdanor, a vastly knowledgeable writer, is long on voting systems but short on these much bigger questions. Yet without answers to them any new constitution would be a lame thing. By no means uniquely, the UK’s constitution is not a fact but a process, a space to be watched. Ineluctably and unevenly, the old order changes; but to assert that it has become a qualitatively new dispensation is, at least for the present, to jump a gun which may never go off. Stephen Sedley is a lord justice of appeal for England and Wales and president of the British Institute for Human Rights. Democracy 2009-10-29T09:40:09+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/serious_issues_being_raised_on_the_policing_of_protest/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/serious_issues_being_raised_on_the_policing_of_protest/ Cross-posted from Open Democracy and written by Guy Aitchison > claims to protest and civil disobedience are in flux as the burgeoning state crackdown on the language, culture and rights to dissent is criminalizing the political voices of all citizens from civil society. What role is there for human rights protections and standards in all of this? Important developments showing how protest in this country is being criminalised and undermined are now being brought to the attention of the mainstream. Not by the BBC of course which remains as spineless as ever when it comes to challenging the regime’s slide into authoritarianism, but by Channel 4 and the Guardian. First, there was last week’s Ready for a Riot, the Dispatches documentary which asked an important question, namely is training officers for “public order” policing in battle-like conditions, where they’re pelted with petrol bombs, and then kitting them out like stormtroopers, the best way to ensure they fulfil their obligations under human rights law to “facilitate” peaceful protest? Or is there a tiny little danger that, as Denis O’Conor, of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (whose report on protest policing is released soon) said, this approach becomes “self-fulfilling”? The G20 showed for everyone to see on YouTube that a bunch of pumped-up stormtroopers are less likely to be in the mood to “facilitate” the peaceful protest of a few hundred campers than crush it mercilessly, even when the enemy has its hands in the air shouting “this is not a riot”. So, who is responsible for setting such inappropriate training for riot officers then? Why it’s the Association of Chief Police Officers, of course. And why are they apparently so oblivious to their obligations under human rights law? Well, wouldn’t you like to know. But you can’t. Because they’re a private company not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. This is the same “self-created, para-judicial, non-parliamentary, private corporate” body whose “terrorism and allied matters” branch manages the network of databases police use to monitor protesters and disrupt their activities, as Anthony blogged yesterday following the Guardian’s report. What has been the response of the government to these disturbing revelations? Are they concerned about this threat to our democratic rights coming from an unaccountable private company? Not at all! Why, they’re positively breezy about the whole thing, as Stuart White points out in an excellent post on Next Left:  Alan Johnson, the Home Secretary, has weighed in on The Guardian’s story that the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is running a ‘giant database of political activists’ whom it categorises as ‘domestic extremists’. Alan tells us, on the one hand, that ‘I haven’t issued any guidelines [to police] on the definition of that phrase [domestic extremism].’ Roughly translated: if the police are doing something dodgy, it’s not my fault.... But then he also tells us: ‘The police know what they are doing, they know how to tackle these demonstrations, they do it very effectively.’ Let’s just pause here for a minute. Isn’t it revealing that Alan regards demonstrations as things that have to be ‘tackled’? And then there is the claim that ‘the police know what they are doing’ and handle (sorry, tackle) demonstrations ‘very effectively’. To put it mildly, these comments are not altogether persuasive in light of what happened at the G20 protests in April. You can read the rest of the post here. Provoked by the Guardian’s report on ACPO’s databases (the existence of which followers of FIT Watch will already have been familiar with) I have submitted the following question to the Metropolitan Police Authority’s new civil liberties panel which meets on November 5th: The panel will be aware that the Guardian is currently running an investigative series into the networks of databases used by police to track and monitor so called “domestic extremists”, a category invented by police to describe campaigners who might engage in civil disobedience regardless of whether they have committed a crime. The three national police units who manage the databases are apparently run by the “terrorism and allied matters” committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers. Will the panel look into: What guidelines are given to police on who should and should not be on these databases? Who has access to these databases? Who is the information shared with, both in the public and the private sector? And how long is the information retained on the databases? I’ll let you know if I get a reply.  2009-10-28T12:57:30+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/the_human_rights_act_1998_to_be_or_not_to_be/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/the_human_rights_act_1998_to_be_or_not_to_be/ Join the discussion and blog in our new symposium on human rights and the Human Rights Act in the lead up to the next generalelection - should it stay or should it go? One year from now the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) could very well be dust binned to Labour’s legacy years under a Cameron government. But has it’s time finally come – and more crucially –will we really miss it? Like the unwanted love child from Labour’s rise to power, the HRA was born out of a period of sweeping modernisation and reforms in the UK that have now, clearly, outgrown paternal limitations that were pressed into it’s parliamentary sovereignty on always having the final say. Was the HRA ever really meant to encroach on policy and practice to the extent that it has, limiting rights and freedoms of government and increasing individuals’ protections? Nice in theory anyway. Keir Starmer brought the HRA back into the public spotlight recently in his Public Prosecution Service annual lecture on “the role of the prosecutor in a modern democracy”. Criticism of Starmer’s political jousting has ranged from tittering waffle to interesting points on interference in political processes and in his duty to uphold the act, with some letters musings on how the Act promotes special interest groups to round it off. Another option has been todump Strasbourg and keep the Act. But asFrancesca Klug points out that this might lead to a break too far: The UK would be the first democratic country in history to repeal a human rights treaty from domestic law Role of the Media What about role of the mass media in generating perceptions of the effectiveness of the HRA– are they debating valid arguments on the contents of the Act for them to consider? Really? Trivialising the purpose of human rights protections can tend to distort the bar that the Act has set in terms of social and cultural standards to emulate and maintained. Why, after all, has human rights legislation received such provenance in counties with obvious histories in dividing and conquering? Does the HRA, then, mainly function as a lightening rod for the demons and undesirables in our society – such as crooks, paedophiles, murderers and alien space invaders? Has it also finally come to a case of the Labouring captains going down in a ship of their own making? Politicking the Act Polarising opposition to government failures over the last ten years is almost too easy when half truths and populist points work their way into the public domain on a daily basis, for example. While the HRA is not an anti-conservative document, the Tories must fend off their own demons in the trade-off of votes for gimmicks and bartering ‘freedom for headlines’ in the most important piece of legislation for universal protection standards on this island. A final thought would lead us to ask if the government has done sufficient work in promoting a culture of human rights since the Act came into force. Could it ever be able to withstand populist rhetoric built on simple zero sum dichotomies that inflict the discourse daily? Designed as an important sling for protecting individuals against the state Goliath, is it no wonder that a culture of positive cases for human rights are so cumbersome to locate when subdued by negative blows from the Conservatives, Labour and political media classes? Seeking to house the debates and explore the arguments, we invite you to blog and comment on human rights and the HRA in the lead up to the next general election. Please include all web and document links by in blog submissions (or alternatively email them to . Cross-posts from your blog or other sites may be included here too - please send details to Exchange Editor Editorial 2009-10-27T16:01:15+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/facing_prosecution_for_reading_stories/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/facing_prosecution_for_reading_stories/ The readers of France’s Elle magazine voted the 10 year old Kurdish girl Medya Ormek as the woman of the week for her unique initiative to take advantage of the campaign of ‘One Story for every home’ by the Sur District Council of the Greater Diyarbakir area in the South-East of Turkey by reading stories in Kurdish to 27 Kurdish children in her room. Her plight highlighted by Elle, is also taken up by Turkish newspaper Taraf. The girl now awaits the outcome of the investigation against her by the Turkish authorities. In theory Kurdish is legal to use within Turkey, although education is yet to be given a green light. Medya Ormek is being investigated for wanting to read stories in her native tongue, and share it with her Kurdish friends unable to read in Kurdish. All Kurdish children are expected to switch to Turkish as soon as they start school. The majority of the Kurdish children are disadvantaged in education because of the time it takes for them to grasp and learn a totally new language to that they were brought up with. Now the Kurdish children want to use their most basic fundamental right : to read in Kurdish. Despite the positive assessment by the EU of Turkey’s human rights record , the Kurdish population is still unable to give expression to their most basic demands, which is to educate their children in their native tongue. The parents not able to name their children in Kurdish. The gravity and the senselessness of the investigation against Medya Ormek is yet to be justified. This surely in itself demands a rebuke from the EU against the over-zealous Turkey who is desperate to please the EU, yet unwilling to do away with its dictatorial practices that target innocent children for wanting to be Kurdish. Democracy 2009-10-21T22:22:28+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/frances_elle_magazine_votes_for_human_rights/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/frances_elle_magazine_votes_for_human_rights/ The Elle magazine reveals the pending prosecution case against the 10 year old Kurdish girl by the Turkish authorities for reading Kurdish stories to 27 Kurdish children in her own house by utilising the ‘ A Story for every House’ iniative by Sur Borough Council in the greater Diyarbakir area, in the Kurdish region of Turkey. The girl was voted as the best woman of the week for her defiance of state authorities who want to charge and try her. It is difficult to undertstand on what premise this trial could take place. Turkey has told the EU commission that it has now started Kurdish broadcasting and is contemplating Kurdish education but the Kurdish children are still being punished for wanting to read in their native tongue. Any other child would receive commendation for the promotion of reading and language in her community, but Medya Ormek faces prosecution. This story, that has featured in the Turkish Taraf newspaper on Sunday, reflects the hypocrisy of human rights policies within the European Commission. The words can add very little to the gravity and the archaic nature of the reckless measure taken against this little Kurdish girl, I therefore will leave you with some thoughts on her plight at EU’s doorstep. EU 2009-10-19T22:55:07+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/you_are_innocent_but_not_that_innocent/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/you_are_innocent_but_not_that_innocent/ It’s starting to happen. Well, at least for me it is. I’m finding myself mumbling my nationality, when asked by new acquaintances on the continent or elsewhere. And it’s not a mumble derived from modesty, like when one is asked what class of degree they have and you can barely make it out when they very considerately whisper the word: “first”. No, the truth is it’s becoming almost as embarrassing to be English as it was for some to be American under Bush. What have we done this time, to ourselves? Section 12 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, came into force on 30th September 2009. Among other things, it has inserted a new section 5A into the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The result of this new section entitled “Restraining orders on acquittal” is in its own words that, “(1) A court before which a person (“the defendant”) is acquitted of an offence may, if it considers it necessary to do so to protect a person from harassment by the defendant, make an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.” So an innocent person, one charged and then acquitted, perhaps from harassment charges, can still be subjected to a restraining order. The section has in mind the inconvenience and (extended trauma) of needing to apply for a restraining order in the civil courts separate to the criminal court proceedings. In that sense the new amendments make sense. But now we have a situation where our criminal courts and the classic statement that one is innocent until proven guilty have surely been completely undermined. Whoever heard of guilty even if proven innocent? Yes the standard of proof in civil courts is less, on a balance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt, but surely it makes a mockery of the criminal system, to say to an accused on the one hand, “you are innocent” and then on the next, “but not that innocent”. The focus of the each forum was not identical until now. In the criminal court, the question to which one needed an affirmative answer beyond reasonable doubt was roughly, “is this individual harassing this other person”. In the civil court the question, needing an affirmative answer on the balance of probabilities was, “is this individual convicted of harassing this other person likely to continue the harassment without being restrained”. Now one forum effectively asks the same question, and may have two different answers, according to both standard of proofs: “is it necessary to restrain this individual to prevent further harassment?” The court may say “no”, because in its criminal eye there hasn’t even been any harassment, but it might also say “yes” because in its civil eye there has been, and it’s likely to worsen. There are so many synonyms for “nonsense”, really there are, look some up, but none of them, not one, quite seem strong enough to accurately describe this situation. Protesting proximate to parliament In my last post I mentioned in a comment the UK Governments pledge to the other nations of the UN Human Rights Council last year (during it’s UPR) to repeal sections 132-138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, prohibiting protest within 1km of parliament without prior permission from the police. As far as I am aware this pledge has not been fulfilled, no repeal has yet happened. Am I wrong? I hope so. Democracy 2009-10-19T17:25:51+00:00 http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/human_rights_and_the_great_lakes_of_africa_region/ http://www.uclshrp.com/exchange/human_rights_and_the_great_lakes_of_africa_region/ Désiré-Joseph blogs at Breaking the cycle:Claiming the Destiny of the Great Lakes of Africa The Great Lakes of Africa have endured decades of war creating instability and oppression. The Leaders of the Rebel Movements of Burundi and Uganda often said that they were called by God to lead the fight in order to be recognised or let their cause be heard. A movement for the liberation of Hutu known as Palipehutu is still operating in the tiny Nation of Burundi, it is currently led by Agathon Rwasa. In Nothern Uganda, another man by the name of Joseph Koni leading the Lord Resistance Army also claims to be called by God to liberate his People. Having sought Political Refuge in the UK, I often compared to Islamist fanatics such as suicide bombers who believe that taking lives will take them straight to Heaven. There are confusions to apply international law or even mention human rights as the world now has to be careful not to offend individuals of a particular group. In my Country of birth Burundi, we observe that an extremist Group refusing to change the name of his movement and not to mention pointing fingers at the acts of genocide he has been responsible for. Everytime the FNL - Palipehutu attacked Burundi, Rebels were singing songs of praise (Religious songs) in which they longed for the day they will hold power. For the victims of the many attacks perpetrated by the same movement, it is unthinkable to know that these individuals will be given tomorrow power and control of the Nation. Comparing the attacks of Terrorists who claim to be of Islam religion, they must have been brainwashed by a small Group of People who think they can impose their way by taking lives. On the 14th August 2004, FNL led by Burundi Rebel Leader Agathon Rwasa, together with former Rwanda Hutu rebels based in Democratic Republic of Congo, and some Congolese Rebels (likely to be Mai-Mai) crossed into Burundi from DRC killing 150 Refugees Banyamulenge who had fled ethnic cleansing. Soon after, the Movement confirmed they were behind the attacks. Lord Resistance Army Joseph Koni used the same strategy in Northern Uganda by slaughtering People for years, and they both (Agathon Rwasa and Joseph Koni) request to be given immunity for the crimes they committed. With human rights laws such groups have been granted immunity from prosecution, disregarding justice for the victims they had traumatised for years.The international community only applies law in some conflicts while they regard other crimes as non important. As long as there is a culture of impunity it will be almost impossible to restore order. Africa 2009-10-18T14:45:59+00:00