Can we start from you education background? Where did you study?
I did my undergraduate law degree at the University of Louvain in 1988. In 1989, I qualified as a practicing lawyer in Luxemburg. In 1990, I did a Master of Laws (LLM) at the University of Cambridge.

And after the LLM?
After the LLM, I returned to Luxemburg to continue my work as a practicing lawyer. At the same time I became an assistant lecturer in Louvain University for couple of years. I also started to teach law at the University Centre in Luxemburg, which later became the University of Luxemburg. I taught various subjects, such as Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and European Human Rights Law. I also gave lectures at the University of Nancy, in France, for quite a long period on the procedure of the European Human Rights Court.

What areas of law did you practice as a lawyer in Luxembourg?
I practiced in various areas, including Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and Human Rights law. I did some cases in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as well. The most important one concered the protection of sources of journalists (Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg).

How did the judiciary career come about?
My predecessor, Marc Fischbach, decided not to terminate his mandate and to go back to Luxemburg to become the first Ombudsman. So the post became vacant and I was presented by my Government as one of three candidates, and I was elected by the Parlamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2004. I got elected to terminate the mandate of my predecessor and I have been re-elected for a full mandate of six years a few weeks ago. This mandate terminates in 2013.

How do you find your your profession as a judge?
It’s fascinating, it’s absolutely fascinating! You deal with so many different questions coming from so many different countries. My job as a judge is different from my previous job as a practicing lawyer. You have to take into account both sides of the argument, whereas as a practicing lawyer, you are promoting only one side of the case.

Did you find any case that was particularly challenging, that you were really puzzled about?
As a Court we should never abandon our control, so that qualifies the theory of the margin of appreciation. The court should retain its power to control even if it leads, in certain areas, to the state exerting certain margin of appreciation, provided that the state or the state authority or state courts do the balancing exercise.

There are many cases which are challenging. The very first hearing I took part in, a few days after I had been sworn in, was a very interesting English case. A freedom of expression case, Steel and Morris v UK. It was the so-called McLibel case.

The McLibel case!
That was a tremendous experience for me because I had just arrived at the Court! The case itself was very interesting! Then you have other important cases, like DH v the Czech Republic on indirect discrimination. It concerned the placement of gypsies’ children, in special schools, in the Czech Republic where the court, in a very long judgement found violation of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Another case in which I dissented was Evans v United Kingdom, the in vitro fertilization case where the court found no violation of Article 8, relying on the margin of appreciation in such a sensitive area where the companion of the young lady withdrew his consent to the in vitro fertilisation. So, we, especially in the Grand Chamber, have the opportunity to deal with really fascinating and important issues.

How does it feel when you dissent? What does it mean for a judge to dissent?
It just means that a judge has a different view on the specific issue. You feel that you do not agree with the majority view, so you explain your own position. But it’s always in the total respect of all the other views. And vice versa also, the majority does not mind if other judges are not in agreement. That’s part of the whole system, and I am personally very much in favour of separate opinions. Although this is not shared by everyone, in Luxemburg for example at the European Court of Justice, there are no separate opinions.

Like la Cour de Cassation!
In la Cour de Cassation the court speaks with one voice. I personally find it enriching to have separate opinions. Just to have another view, an alternative view.

An alternative view which might become the law in the future.
Absolutely. As one commentator said, dissenting views of today might be the majority view of tomorrow.

Can we talk about poverty? How does the law protect socio-economic rights?
It is difficult for me in the present stage to take a stance on this issue because the Court has never found a violation instance of Article 3 in connection to poverty. But that does not mean that the Court might not reconsider that issue in the future. We have communicated one case under Article 3 and one case under Article 8. So it depends how this case will be argued and appraised by the Court. So I cannot, at the present stage, make comments as to what might happen, because we are just at the start of maybe reconsidering new issues.

Do you think that national European legal systems might one day protect socio-economic rights, or is that too far away?
The Court has already said that there is no watertight division, between classical civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. It depends on the circumstances. If a socio-economic problem might also be a problem under the classic civil and political rights. So, there is no right not to be poor, but, being poor might be a problem under Article 3, or under Article 8.

Do you want to tell us a little bit about the Taliadorou v Cyprus case?
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights has now encompassed within Article 8 the right to reputation. In the Cypriot case the Supreme Court did not award moral damages in a situation where the person had been dismissed and the dismissal had been found to be unlawful by the Cypriot courts, but the damages were rejected. And the Court found that this was a problem under the procedural obligation under Article 8.

Which was the most interesting case you have decided so far? Did you take part in Saadi v Italy by the way?
Yes! Saadi v Italy is probably one of the greatest judgments the court delivered in recent years because the court stood firm on the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture, even in the context of fighting terrorism, that there could be no exception to that.

Nachova and Others v Bulgaria is also important. The court made a general statement about the danger of racial hatred, that racial discrimination is a threat to the view democratic society has of the diversity of the cultural enrichment. This general statement in Natchova is quite important. The Court did that on purpose, it’s not by accident that in Grand Chamber judgements such statements are made. The Court wanted to put the Natchova case in a broader context of racial violence.

How does it feel to know that law students and law practitioners, including your fellow judges, actually read your judgements?
It’s a heavy burden because you have to be very careful. You must be aware that what you are going to write will be examined thoroughly by commentators, practitioners, and judges. At the same time it is a very rewarding feeling because at court you make a difference. You can change the human rights situation by standing firm on the principles. So it’s a mixed feeling, excitement, but also great satisfaction.

Do you want to tell us a little bit about the UCL Human Rights Moot? The finals will take place in the Grand Chamber on the 3rd of April 2009, and you will be one of the judges!
I’m very happy that UCL will come to Strasbourg! I’m very happy in a personal capacity as well because I now have some connections with UCL. This is the third or fourth time that I’ve come to UCL for an event or conference, so that doubles the pleasure, so to speak, to welcome you in Strasbourg.

So how did you establish the initial connection with UCL?
Before I became a judge in Strasbourg, Professor Markesinis had invited me to become a visiting professor at UCL. I could not accept this prestigious offer because as a judge you cannot at the same time be a professor: you have so much work as a judge that you do not have time to teach at the same time. However, I still had the opportunity to to write a chapter in the book Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study, which has been edited by Professors Oliver and Fedtke.

So that combines the best of both worlds! So how would you personally comment on the Court and the European Convention on Human Rights? What do you think its value is in today’s world?
The European Court is the lighthouse and the European Convention is the light, the lamp in the lighthouse. The case law of our Court is even quoted by Supreme Courts in European countries. So when it comes to human rights questions, I think our Court has a leading role to play not only in Europe, but also in the world. Because our case law is so elaborate on human rights questions.

The image used in this article is copyright of the Council of Europe