The claimant sought on the basis of article 6 ECHR (right to a fair trial) to challenge the appeal committee’s decision regarding the exclusion of V (the claimant’s son) from school.

The claimant’s son, V was involved in a fight at school.  S, who was the teacher who came upon the aftermath of the fight, alleged that V had been verbally aggressive and that he had been in possession of a knife. V, although admitting to the other accusations, denied he was in possession of a knife, claiming that he was wearing a silver bracelet chain whose loose end hung into his hand and which he often grasped when nervous by flicking his wrist to reach it. Initially V was permanently excluded from school on the basis that he was seen by staff and pupils to be carrying a knife’.

The pupil disciplinary committee of the school’s governing body met to consider the exclusion and on three further occasions to consider whether or not to order that V should be reinstated, deciding that he should not. An appeal against that decision was heard by an appeal panel, it was rejected.

The following issue, inter alia, arose: whether regulation 7A of the Education (Pupil Exclusion and Appeals) (Maintained Schools) (England) Regulation 2002, SI 2002/3178, (the 2002 Regulations) infringed article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the grounds that the standard of proof applied by an appeal panel in respect of a claim against a pupil should be the criminal standard of proof, that was, that they would have to be sure of the allegations against the pupils before upholding them.

The application was dismissed. Article 6 only applied to a person in “the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of a criminal charge against him”. For the purpose of establishing whether the decision concerned the determination of V’s civil rights and obligations, V was unable to establish that he had a right to continue the studies he had begun at the school. The contention that the hearing in front of the panel was ‘a determination of a criminal charge’ would also be rejected. In obiter, the judge found that even if article 6 was engaged there was no reason why the standard of proof should not be the balance of probabilities. Even where the conduct alleged amounted to a criminal offence, it did not follow that proof beyond reasonable doubt would be required. The proceedings before the panel did not become criminal proceedings just because one of the disciplinary matters alleged happened to have a criminal law dimension.

The panel had not failed to give effect to the statutory guidance. The panel had explained clearly that having considered the evidence it was satisfied that it was more probable than not that V had carried the knife and threatened a member of staff. No further reasons were required especially bearing in mind that the panel was not a court of law. There was no reason to believe that the panel did not consider that there was compelling evidence. In so far as the claimant was challenging the correctness of the panel’s conclusion, judicial review was not the appropriate way for such a contention whereas in the instant case there was adequate evidence to justify the conclusion which the panel had reached.